Techniques for utilizing multiple network interfaces for a cloud shell

ABSTRACT

Techniques for utilizing multiple network interfaces for a cloud shell are provided. The techniques include receiving, by a computer system, a command to execute an operation by the computer system, the command being received from a router via a primary virtual network interface card (vNIC). The computer system may execute the operation, generating an output of the operation. The techniques also include transmitting, by the computer system, a message comprising the output of the operation to a shell subnet via a secondary vNIC, the secondary vNIC being configured for unidirectional transmission from the computer system to the shell subnet. The shell subnet may be configured to transmit the output of the operation to an external network via a network gateway.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.16/993,973, filed Aug. 14, 2020, entitled “TECHNIQUES FOR UTILIZINGMULTIPLE NETWORK INTERFACES FOR A CLOUD SHELL”. This application is alsorelated to U.S. Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 16/993,970, filedon Aug. 14, 2020, entitled “TECHNIQUES FOR USING SIGNED NONCES TO SECURECLOUD SHELLS,” and U.S. Non-Provisional application Ser. No. 17/078,835,filed on Oct. 23, 2020, entitled “TECHNIQUES FOR PERSISTING DATA ACROSSINSTANCES OF A CLOUD SHELL,” the disclosures of which are incorporatedby reference in their entirety for all purposes.

BACKGROUND

Cloud-based platforms provide scalable and flexible computing resourcesfor users. Such cloud-based platforms, also referred to asinfrastructure as a service (IaaS), may offer entire suites of cloudsolutions around a customer's data, for example, solutions for authoringtransformations, loading data, and presenting the data. IaaS systems mayimplement security protocols to protect against unauthorized access tocompute resources and data.

BRIEF SUMMARY

Techniques are provided (e.g., a method, a system, non-transitorycomputer-readable medium storing code or instructions executable by oneor more processors) for securing cloud shells against unauthorizedaccess by external devices, using multiple network interfaces incoordination with multiple virtual cloud networks isolating differentIaaS sub-systems.

In a first aspect, a method includes receiving a command to execute anoperation by a computer system, the command being received from a routervia a primary virtual network interface card (vNIC); executing theoperation; generating an output of the operation; and transmitting amessage comprising the output of the operation to a shell subnet via asecondary virtual network interface card, the secondary virtual networkinterface card being configured for unidirectional transmission from thecomputer system to the shell subnet. The shell subnet may be configuredto transmit the output of the operation to an external network via anetwork gateway.

In an example, the operation may be requested by a user of a userdevice, and generating an output of the operation may include generatinga return message for the user device and transmitting the return messageto the router via the primary virtual network interface card. Theprimary virtual network interface card may be configured to accept thereturn message for the user device and reject the message comprising theoutput of the operation.

In an example, the computer system may be a virtual machine in a firstvirtual cloud network, the first virtual cloud network being constitutedin a private root compartment.

In an example, the router may be in a second virtual cloud network, thesecond virtual cloud network being different from the first virtualcloud network and being constituted in the private root compartment.

In an example, the shell subnet may be in a third virtual cloud network,the third virtual cloud network being different from the first virtualcloud network and being constituted in a public root compartment.

In an example, the private root compartment may be associated with afirst block of IP addresses attributable to network traffic from theprivate root compartment. The public root compartment may be associatedwith a second block of IP addresses, the second block of IP addressesbeing different from the first block of IP addresses. The second blockof IP addresses may be attributable to network traffic from one or moreusers of the computer system.

In an example, the network gateway may be a network address translation(NAT) gateway, being configured to transmit messages using an IP addressof a block of IP addresses attributable to network traffic from one ormore users of the computer system.

In a second aspect, a computer system includes one or more processorsand a memory in communication with the one or more processors, thememory configured to store computer-executable instructions, whereinexecuting the computer-executable instructions causes the one or moreprocessors to perform steps including one or more steps of the method ofthe first aspect and subsequent examples.

In a third aspect, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium,storing computer-executable instructions that, when executed, cause oneor more processors of a computer system to perform steps including oneor more steps of the method of the first aspect and subsequent examples.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an example technique utilizing multiple networkinterfaces for a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example system utilizing multiple networkinterfaces for managing communication of a secure shell instance, inaccordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example technique for unidirectional communicationby a secure shell instance using multiple network interfaces, inaccordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example technique using a first network interfacefor bi-directional communication with a secure shell instance, inaccordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example technique for unidirectional communicationwith a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example regional system for managing communicationof a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or more embodiments.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example flow for utilizing multiple networkinterfaces for a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or moreembodiments.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example flow for bi-directional communication witha secure shell instance using a network interface, in accordance withone or more embodiments.

FIG. 9 illustrates an example flow for unidirectional communication froma secure shell instance using a network interface, in accordance withone or more embodiments.

FIG. 10 is a block diagram illustrating one pattern for implementing acloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementinga cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementinga cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating another pattern for implementinga cloud infrastructure as a service system, according to at least oneembodiment.

FIG. 14 is a block diagram illustrating an example computer system,according to at least one embodiment.

In the appended figures, similar components and/or features may have thesame reference label. Further, various components of the same type maybe distinguished by following the reference label by a dash and a secondlabel that distinguishes among the similar components. If only the firstreference label is used in the specification, the description isapplicable to any one of the similar components having the same firstreference label irrespective of the second reference label.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description, various embodiments will be described. Forpurposes of explanation, specific configurations and details are setforth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments.However, it will also be apparent to one skilled in the art that theembodiments may be practiced without the specific details. Furthermore,well-known features may be omitted or simplified in order not to obscurethe embodiment being described.

Cloud-based platforms provide scalable and flexible computing resourcesfor users. Such cloud-based platforms, also referred to asinfrastructure as a service (IaaS), may offer entire suites of cloudsolutions around a customer's data, for example solutions for authoringtransformations, loading data, and presenting the data. Users of IaaSresources may request to create a secure terminal in a secure shellinstance (e.g., a virtual machine running on a virtual cloud network(VCN)), so that operations and data transfers may be carried outsecurely (e.g., with two-way encryption via a Web Socket secure (wss)connection).

An aspect of secure communication may include controlling networktraffic to and from the secure shell instance. Network traffic controlsmay include one or more techniques and/or approaches to isolating thesecure shell instance from one or more IaaS services (e.g., core cloudservices) that may be in communication with multiple instances and mayhave access to and/or control over data and compute resources of theIaaS system. The network traffic controls may include implementingdirectional limits on network communication into and out of the secureshell instance. The directional limits in turn may block some inboundtraffic from external systems, and block outbound traffic to IaaSservices. Isolating the secure shell instance may include implementingmultiple virtual cloud networks, for example, to isolate core IaaSservices from the secure shell instance, both being isolated fromnetwork communication services.

As an illustrative example, a user may submit a command to a secureshell instance through a user device (e.g., using a graphical userinterface and/or command line interface of a browser). The secure shellinstance may be configured with a primary virtual network interface card(vNIC), which one or more security rules may define as ingress-only(unidirectional with respect to inbound network traffic to the secureshell instance). The command may cause the secure shell instance togenerate output, which may include an instruction to send the output toan external address (e.g., over the internet). The secure shell instancemay send the output via a secondary vNIC, rather than the primary vNIC.Similarly to the primary vNIC, the secondary vNIC may be configured withsecurity rules limiting network traffic through the secondary vNIC asegress-only (unidirectional with respect to outbound traffic from thesecure shell instance). In this way, authorized network traffic mayarrive to the secure shell instance via the primary vNIC and may leavethe secure shell instance via the secondary vNIC. Furthermore, thesecure shell instance may run on a compute isolation VCN, isolated fromboth a service VCN and a network isolation VCN, which may run IaaSservices and network communication services, respectively.

Such an arrangement may provide improved security for both the secureshell instance and the IaaS system as a whole. In part, improvedsecurity may result, because the secure shell instance may be limited inits ability to send messages to the service VCN via the primary vNIC,and may be limited in its ability to receive messages from externalnetworks via the network isolation VCN and the secondary vNIC. In thisway, unauthorized network traffic from the internet (or other networks)may be unable to access the secure shell instance, and the secure shellinstance may be unable to access core IaaS resources withoutauthorization.

FIG. 1 illustrates an example technique 100 utilizing multiple networkinterfaces for a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or moreembodiments. Directional control of communication between virtual cloudnetworks may provide improved security of constituent IaaS resources,and may limit and/or prevent security risks from reaching core IaaSresources. To that end, the example technique 100 may include multipleapproaches to controlling the flow of system communications, using oneor more system components that may be implemented as virtual systems ina distributed computing system (e.g., a cloud network). In someembodiments, the approaches may be implemented to control the originand/or destination of communications with a secure shell instance 150,which may be an example of a virtual machine (VM) operating on a virtualcloud network (VCN). In some embodiments, the secure shell instancecommunicates with other components of a distributed computing system(e.g., routers, subnets, etc.) via one or more virtual network interfacecards (vNICs), as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 ,below.

In some embodiments, the example technique 100 includes receiving acommand to execute an operation (e.g., operation 102). In someembodiments, the command is generated and/or sent from a user device120. The user device 120 may include any form of electric deviceconfigured to access a network (e.g., the internet and/or a privatenetwork), such as a personal computer, a digital workstation, a tablet,a smartphone, etc. The command may include any type of instructiongenerated by a user of the user device 120 (e.g., via a browserinterface of an IaaS provider). For example, the command may include acompute task, a storage task (e.g., input-output operation, movingstored data, data transformation, etc.), a configuration task (e.g., acommand accessing operating parameters of the secure shell instance150), etc. In some embodiments, the user device 120 may communicate witha system service (e.g., a browser interface and/or command lineinterface service) that directs the command to an appropriate sub-systemand/or cloud network resource. Such an arrangement may provide networkisolation and/or improved system security through network isolation. Forexample, using a secondary vNIC in a VCN on a different tenancy fromthat of IaaS services may permit user outgoing network traffic to beidentifiable (e.g., a source IP address may come from a different IPaddress pool from that of IaaS services), as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 2 , below.

In some embodiments, the command received in operation 102 is sent to acloud shell router 130. The cloud shell router may be a virtual routerimplemented in a virtual cloud network, as described in more detail inreference to FIG. 2 , below. The cloud shell router 130 may transmit thecommand (e.g., operation 104) toward an appropriate addressee (e.g.,secure shell instance 150), which may be implemented in a separatevirtual cloud network. In some embodiments, implementing separatesubsystems that perform the different operations of example technique100 in separate virtual cloud networks may provide improved security forcore cloud resources and/or user data. In some embodiments, the cloudshell router 130 may communicate with the secure shell instance 150 viaa primary virtual network access card 140 (vNIC). In some embodiments,the primary vNIC 140 may represent the network interface configurationfor the virtual machine on which the secure shell instance 150 isimplemented. As such, the primary vNIC 140 may be configured with one ormore operational parameters (e.g., a MAC address), as well as securityrules, which may permit the primary vNIC 140 to selectively routecommunications to and/or from the secure shell instance 150, asdescribed in more detail in reference to the figures, below.

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 may execute theoperation indicated in the command (e.g., operation 106). As describedabove, the secure shell instance 150 can be a virtual machine (VM)configured to execute one or more types of operations, includingdatabase operations, compute operations, etc. For example, the secureshell instance 150 may execute the command to modify one or more aspectsof user IaaS resources and/or data in a compartment of a distributedcomputer system (e.g., to move data stored in one data center to anotherdata center, to send data to an external server over a public network,etc.).

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 may generate a returnmessage (e.g., operation 108) as a result of executing the operationincluded in the command. The return message may be intended for the userof the user device 120 and/or the user device 120, rather than for acore IaaS service or an external server (e.g., on a public network orover a private network). In some embodiments, the return message may begenerated to provide outcome information in reference to the operationexecuted by the secure shell instance 150. For example, the secure shellinstance 150 may generate the return message to indicate that theoperation was successfully completed, was aborted, failed, rescheduled,etc. The return message may include status information, as well asspecific data requested as part of the return message (e.g., a checkbit,memory location, etc.).

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 may transmit thereturn message to the cloud shell router 130 (e.g., operation 110). Thesecure shell instance 150 may transmit the return message via theprimary vNIC 140. As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 ,below, the primary vNIC 140 may be configured to transmit returnmessages to the cloud shell router 130, but to reject other types ofmessages received from the secure shell instance 150.

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 may generate outputof the operation (e.g., operation 112). The output of the operation mayinclude, but is not limited to, communications, data, and/orinstructions to external systems in communication with the secure shellinstance 150 over a network (e.g., a public network and/or a privatenetwork). The secure shell instance 150 may be instructed to generatethe output, for example, when the operation included in the command fromthe user device 120 includes transferring data over an external network.In the case of transferring data, the secure shell instance 150 may sendan instruction to a data management service of the IaaS system, via aninternal network of the IaaS system.

As part of executing the command, for example, when the command is totransfer data or send a message to an external server, the secure shellinstance 150 may transmit a message including the output of theoperation (e.g., operation 114) to a shell subnet 170. The secure shellinstance 150 may communicate with the shell subnet 170 via a secondaryvNIC 160. As with the primary vNIC 140, the secondary vNIC 160 may beconfigured with one or more operational parameters (e.g., a differentMAC address) and input-output parameters (e.g., security rules) tocontrol the flow of data and messages to the secure shell instance 140.As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 , below, thesecondary vNIC 160 may be configured to be unidirectional, permittingonly outgoing messages from the secure shell instance 150 to the shellsubnet 170 (e.g., an egress-only configuration). In some embodiments, aunidirectional, egress-only, configuration for the secondary vNIC 160may permit the secure shell instance 150 to operate with improvedsecurity against external risks of interference by penetration and/orunauthorized access by non-user devices.

In some embodiments, the shell subnet 170 may transmit the output of theoperation to an external network 180 (e.g., operation 116). In someembodiments, the external network 180 is a public network. In somecases, connecting the secure shell instance 150 and/or the shell subnet170 to a public network may introduce a security risk due to thepotential for malicious systems to attempt to access the secure shellinstance 150 and/or core cloud resources. For example, coopting thesecure shell instance 150 could provide access to core cloud resourcesthat could, in turn, grant access to user data for multiple users in acloud service region. For this reason, the shell subnet 170 maycommunicate with the external network 180 via a network addresstranslation (NAT) gateway, as described in more detail in reference toFIG. 2 , below.

As such, the example technique 100 demonstrates how communicationbetween the user device 120, the secure shell instance 150, and theexternal network 180 may be managed to potentially reduce risk ofsecurity threats presented by connecting the secure shell instance tothe external network 180. In some embodiments, the example technique 100provides unidirectional transmission of messages for some types ofinformation, while permitting return messages to be passed back from thesecure shell instance 150 to the user device 120. Implementing suchcontrols may provide improved security for user data stored to which thesecure shell instance 150 has access, and may isolate the secure shellinstance 150 from core cloud services.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example system 200 utilizing multiple networkinterfaces for managing communication of a secure shell instance, inaccordance with one or more embodiments. The various operationsdescribed in reference to FIG. 1 , above, may be implemented by theexample system 200, which may include one or more additional features topotentially improve security of the secure shell instance 150 and corecloud resources.

In some embodiments, the cloud shell router 130, the secure shellinstance 150, and the shell subnet 170 may be implemented as virtualsystems in separate virtual cloud networks (VCNs). Furthermore, theseparate VCNs may be implemented in multiple root compartments (alsoreferred to as “tenancies”). As illustrated in FIG. 2 , the cloud shellrouter 130 is implemented in a service VCN 210, the secure shellinstance 150 in a compute isolation VCN 220, with both in a private rootcompartment 230. By contrast, the shell subnet 170 may be implemented ina network isolation VCN 240 in a public root compartment 250. Ingeneral, the private root compartment 230 and the public rootcompartment 250 may constituted different and/or separate logicalcontainers of data and compute resources implemented in an IaaS system,such that system resources in the private root compartment 230 cannot beaccessed by those of the public root compartment 250. The private rootcompartment 230 and the public root compartment 250 may be associatedwith different and distinguishable blocks of IP addresses, which maypermit the determination of the origin of messages from an IaaS systemas from the public root compartment 250 or the private root compartment230.

In some embodiments, the public root compartment 250 and the constituentsystems implemented within the public root compartment 250 (e.g., theshell subnet 170 in the network isolation VCN 240) may be assigned an IPaddress from a block of IP addresses identified with user outputoperations (e.g., the message of operation 116 in FIG. 1 ). By contrast,the private root compartment 230 and the constituent systems implementedwithin the private root compartment (e.g., the cloud shell router 130 inthe service VCN 210) may be assigned an IP address from a block of IPaddresses identified with IaaS system communication operations (e.g.,communication with external networks such as the external network 180).Using separate blocks of IP addresses, by which the origin ofcommunications may be attributed to either the IaaS system itself or auser of the IaaS system, may improve security of the overall IaaSnetwork (e.g., across multiple data centers, regions, etc.). Forexample, some IaaS systems may be implemented in multiple data centers(also referred to as domains) in a region, and a global IaaS system mayinclude multiple regions in communication with each other over privateand/or public networks. Distinguishing user-source communication fromsystem source communication may reduce the risk of large-scale systemtraffic-type attacks (e.g., distributed denial of service, or DDOSattacks), from reaching core services.

As an illustrative example, communication from the shell subnet 170 maybe attributable to the user of the user device 120 (albeit potentiallyanonymized) by the IP address of the shell subnet 170. As such, amessage from the shell subnet 170 purporting to originate from a corecloud service of the IaaS system may be rejected at the receiver point,for example, for the source IP address and the source identifier (e.g.,username) not matching. In another example, isolating outgoing usertraffic to a public root compartment may provide improved forensicinformation to determine a source of a penetration into the IaaS system.By tracing the IP address of source to the public root compartment 250,for example, an investigation may be able to identify a compromised userinstance, and may potentially reveal that a core IaaS service has notbeen compromised.

In some embodiments, the user device 120 (e.g., a browser and/or commandline interface executing a secure shell client), may connect with thecloud shell router 130. The user device 120 may connect to the cloudshell router over the external network 180 (e.g., a public network). Theexternal network may 180 include, for example, the internet, anencrypted network, etc. The user device 120 may communicate with thecloud shell router 130 via an internet gateway 260 (e.g., “NET”gateway). The internet gateway 260 can be a virtual router added to theservice VCN 210 to provide a path for network traffic between theservice VCN 210 and the external network 180.

In some embodiments, the service VCN 210 also implements additional IaaScore services including, but not limited to, secure session managerservices, volume manager services instance manager services, and/or webservers, which may facilitate the creation, management, termination, andcleanup of the secure shell instance 150 and its associated data (e.g.,block volumes, object storage, etc.).

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 communicates with thecloud shell router 130 via the primary virtual network interface card(vNIC) 140. A vNIC can enable an instance to connect to a VCN and maydetermine how the instance connects with other systems inside andoutside the VCN. As described in reference to FIG. 1 , above, theprimary vNIC 140 may be configured to manage traffic between the cloudshell router and the secure shell instance 150 (e.g., using a securityrule).

Security rules may specify a type of ingress or egress traffic allowedin or out of the primary vNIC 140. For example, the primary vNIC 140 maybe configured to accept signals from the cloud shell router 130 to thesecure shell instance 150, but to reject output messages from the secureshell instance 150. In some embodiments, the primary vNIC 140 may acceptreturn messages from the secure shell instance 150 addressed to the userdevice 120, for example, as a response to a request for a return messageincluded in a message from the user device 120. The primary vNIC 140 maybe attached to the secure shell instance 150, and security rules (e.g.,ingress/egress controls) may be a part of the configuration of thesecure shell instance 150 at the time of launch and/or as defaultfeatures of the secure shell instance 150.

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 can be a virtualmachine (e.g., a software-based emulation of a full computer that runswithin a physical host computer, also referred to as a “VM”) that isspecialized for the user of the user device 120 with a configurationfile provided by a constituent sub-system of the service VCN 210 (e.g.,the session manager service). In some embodiments, the secure shellinstance 150 can be selected from an instance pool 222 that contains oneor more pre-created instances configured with default parameters. Thedefault parameters may include security rules that define trafficmanagement rules for the primary vNIC 140.

In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 includes thesecondary vNIC 160. The secondary vNIC 160 may be attached to the secureshell instance 150 during configuration of the pre-created instance fromthe instance pool 222. Alternatively, the pre-created instances in theinstance pool 222 may be pre-configured to include the secondary vNIC160. In some embodiments, the secondary vNIC includes egress-onlysecurity rules (e.g., controls on traffic flow to limit communicationonly to a single direction from the secure shell instance 150 to theshell subnet 170). As described in more detail in reference to thefigures, below. As described above, limiting network traffic in thismanner may provide additional and/or improved security for the secureshell instance 150 and the service VCN 210.

In some embodiments, the shell subnet 170 may be configured tocommunicate with the external network 180 and/or a private IaaS network282 via one or more virtual routers implemented in the network isolationVCN 240. In some embodiments, the shell subnet 170 may send outputtraffic received from the secure shell instance 150 via the secondaryvNIC 160 to the external network 180 using a network address translation(NAT) gateway 270. The NAT gateway 270 can be a virtual routerconfigured to perform network address translation. A NAT gateway maygive cloud resources without public IP addresses access to the internetwithout exposing those resources to incoming internet connections. Forexample, the secure shell instance 150 and the shell subnet 170 may lackaccess to the external network 180, as a security measure to potentiallyreduce the risk of penetration from malicious attacks. In such cases,the NAT gateway 270 may provide a connection to the internet using an IPaddress (e.g., from the public block of IP addresses attributable to thepublic root compartment 250) that is not directly identified with thesecure shell instance 150 or the shell subnet 170.

In some embodiments, output from the secure shell instance 150 thatinvolves requests to core IaaS resources may be routed by the shellsubnet 170 to a service (SVC) gateway 272. The service gateway 272 canbe a virtual router attached to the network isolation VCN 240 that mayenable VCN hosts to privately access IaaS services (such as databaseresources, object storage, metadata management, etc.) without exposingthe VCN hosts or the IaaS to the public internet. As such, the servicegateway 272 may permit the shell subnet 170 to send output traffic overan internal network 282 (e.g., “private network”) configured tocommunicate with IaaS core services in the region and/or other regions.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example technique 300 for unidirectionalcommunication by a secure shell instance using multiple networkinterfaces, in accordance with one or more embodiments. Theconfiguration of the secure shell instance 150 may include adding one ormore additional virtual network interface cards (vNICs) to the secureshell instance 150. The vNICs may permit the secure shell instance 150to send output messages via a separate communication path from thatwhich may be used to receive instructions and/or commands from a userdevice (e.g., user device 120 of FIG. 1 ). In some embodiments, thevNICs may be configured with security rules to define directionalcontrol of communication with the secure shell instance 150, asdescribed in more detail, below.

As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 , the primary vNIC140 may be configured to facilitate communication between the secureshell instance 150 and the cloud shell router 130. In some embodiments,the secure shell instance 150 may run in a compute isolation virtualcloud network (VCN), while the cloud shell router 130 may run in aservice VCN. In some embodiments, the secure shell instance 150 mayinclude the primary vNIC 140 as a default configuration. In someembodiments, the primary vNIC 140 may be configured with security rulesthat define an ingress-only limitation on communications with the secureshell instance 150. The ingress-only limitation may limit the types ofcommunications that can be received by the secure shell instance 150,and/or may restrict the sources from which communications can bereceived by the secure shell instance 150.

In some embodiments, the primary vNIC 140 may be configured to permitincoming communications from core cloud resources (e.g., whitelist IaaSsystem components). For example, the cloud shell router 130 may transmitthe command to the secure shell instance 150 (e.g., operation 310). Thesecure shell instance 150 may receive the command via the primary vNIC140 (e.g., operation 312) that may be configured to permitcommunications from the cloud shell router 130. The secure shellinstance 150 may then execute the operations indicated in the commandand may generate the output described in reference to FIG. 1 (e.g.,operation 314).

In some embodiments, the secondary vNIC 160 may be configured to serveas an egress point for communications to facilitate transmission of theoutput from the secure shell instance 150 to an external network (e.g.,external network 180 of FIG. 1 ) via the shell subnet 170. As describedin more detail in reference to FIG. 2 , the shell subnet 170 may run ina network isolation VCN to potentially improve security by reducing therisk of penetration by malicious attacks originating from the externalnetwork. In some embodiments, the secondary vNIC 160 may be configuredduring setup of the secure shell instance as a pre-created instance(e.g., in the instance pool 222 of FIG. 2 ). In some embodiments, thesecondary vNIC 160 may be configured during specialization of the secureshell instance 150 (e.g., as by the session manager service, theinstance manager service, and/or other core cloud resources). Thesecondary vNIC 160 may be configured with security rules to permittingoutgoing messages from the secure shell instance 150, for example,addressed to the shell subnet 170. For example, the secure shell subnet150 may transmit the output via the secondary vNIC 160 (e.g., operation316) and may direct a message containing the output to the shell subnet170 (e.g., operation 318). In this way, the example technique 300 mayinclude implementing the primary vNIC 140 as the ingress point 340 forcommunications to the secure shell instance 150 and the secondary vNIC160 as a separate egress point 360 for communications from the secureshell instance 150.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example technique 400 using a first networkinterface for bi-directional communication with a secure shell instance,in accordance with one or more embodiments. The secure shell instance150 may be configured (e.g., during setup and/or specialization) to sendmessages via both the primary virtual network access card 140 (vNIC) andthe secondary vNIC 160, albeit according to a defined approach toprovide secure communications and potentially reduce the risk of breach.

In some embodiments, the primary vNIC 140 may include security rulesthat define a blanket prohibition on all outgoing messages from thesecure shell instance 150 (e.g., an ingress-only 440 rule withoutexceptions). By contrast, the security rules may define a type ofcommunication, a destination of communications, or other exceptions tothe security rules. For example, the primary vNIC 140 may be configuredto permit transmission of return messages 442 from the secure shellinstance 150 to the cloud shell router 130 that are addressed to a userdevice (e.g., user device 120 of FIG. 1 ). Such return messages 442 mayinclude status information of the operations, (e.g., completed, aborted,terminated, etc.), and may include other return information request bythe user device as part of the command.

As an illustrative example, the secure shell instance 150 may sendmessages by two different paths 442, 460 depending on the type and/ordestination of the messages. In this example, the cloud shell router 130transmits the command to the secure shell router (e.g., operation 410)and the secure shell instance 150 receives the command from the cloudshell router 130 via the primary vNIC 140 (e.g., operation 412). Thesecure shell instance 150 may execute the operations indicated by thecommand and may generate output and a return message (e.g., operation414). As described in reference to FIG. 3 , above, the secure shellinstance 150 may send the output as a message addressed to the shellsubnet 170 via the secondary vNIC 160 (e.g., operation 416). Bycontrast, the secure shell instance 150 may send the return message by adifferent path 442, via the primary vNIC 140, back to the cloud shellrouter 130 (e.g., operation 418).

Configuring the primary vNIC 140 to permit return messages may provideadditional security to the system implementing example technique 400.For example, return messages including status information may be used bycore cloud services to track and manage resource usage by the secureshell instance 150. Furthermore, configuring the secure shell instance150 to send return messages to the cloud shell router 130, rather thanthe shell subnet 170 may potentially reduce the risk of the secure shellinstance being commandeered by an external system, were the shell subnet170 to be compromised, at least in part if the external system cannotreceive feedback that permits it to replace the owner of the secureshell instance 150.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example technique 500 for unidirectionalcommunication with a secure shell instance, in accordance with one ormore embodiments. The corollary of the security rules described inreference to FIGS. 3-4 , above, may include that the secure shellinstance 150 may be limited in the type and manner of communication itmay be configured to implement with regard to output from operations itexecutes.

In some embodiments, the primary virtual network interface card 140(vNIC) may be configured with security rules that do not permit outputmessages from the secure shell instance 150 to be sent via the primaryvNIC 140. This may be implemented to control access from the secureshell instance 150, which may run on a compute isolation virtual cloudnetwork (VCN) (e.g., compute isolation VCN 220 of FIG. 2 ), to corecloud services running on a service VCN (e.g., service VCN 210 of FIG. 2). While some types of messages may be permitted (e.g., returnmessages), as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 4 , above,output messages, which may include additional and/or alternative typesof messages (e.g., execute commands, data transformation instructions,input-output operation instructions, etc.). Limiting the type ofcommunications permitted by the primary vNIC 140 may, therefore,potentially reduce the risk of breaching the service VCN or core cloudservices by the secure shell instance 150.

In an illustrative example, the primary vNIC 140 may be configured to beingress-only with respect to output messages from the secure shellinstance 150. As such, when the secure shell instance 150 executes thecommand from a user device (e.g., user device 120 of FIG. 1 ) andgenerates output (e.g., operation 510), a transmission of the outputaddressed to the cloud shell router 130 may be rejected 542 by theprimary vNIC 140 (e.g., operation 512). Rejection 542 by the primaryvNIC 140 may describe any number of logical operations that prevent theoutput message from being sent to the cloud shell router 130 and/or anyother component systems of the service VCN. For example, the securityrules may blacklist specific destinations by address (e.g., MACaddress).

In some embodiments, the secondary vNIC 160 may be configured withsecurity rules that do not permit the secure shell instance 150 toreceive network traffic via the secondary vNIC 160. This may beimplemented to control access to the secure shell instance 150 by theshell subnet 170 which may communicate with the internet, and, as such,may be at risk of attack by external systems. The security rulesimplemented as part of configuring the secondary vNIC 160 may include ablanket limitation on all inbound communications from the shell subnet170 or any other IaaS system to the secure shell instance.Alternatively, types of communication, sources, or specific messages maybe permitted as part of configuring the secondary vNIC 160 (e.g.,whitelisting).

In an illustrative example, the secondary vNIC 160 may be configured tobe egress-only with respect to communications to the secure shellinstance 150. In this example, an external network request may bereceived at the shell subnet 170 (e.g., operation 514). The externalnetwork request may be an instruction for the shell subnet 170 to send acommand to the secure shell instance 150 (for example, to read datastored in a block volume system attached to the secure shell instance150). The secondary vNIC 160, being configured for egress-only in thisexample, may be limited to unidirectional communication, permitting thesecure shell instance 150 to send output messages via the secondary vNICbut may reject 562 the external network request from the shell subnet170 (e.g., operation 516).

In some embodiments, the secondary vNIC 160 may similarly reject 562 anyincoming message even when received from other origins. For example, theMAC address of the secondary vNIC 160 may be discovered by an externalsystem, which may attempt to address the secondary vNIC 160 directly.Egress-only security configuration may similarly protect the secureshell instance 150 from such attempts.

FIG. 6 illustrates an example system 600 for managing communication of asecure shell instance in a regional cloud system, in accordance with oneor more embodiments. The techniques described in reference to theprevious figures may be implemented in a regional IaaS system. RegionalIaaS systems may include multiple domains 610, where a domain may be anIaaS identifier corresponding to a data center, being a physicalinstallation of computer hardware configured to operate the IaaS system(e.g., servers, network infrastructure, etc.). Some components of theexample system 600 may be regional, while others may be domain specific.Implementing a regional system may potentially reduce system overheadand reduce the demand on system resources attributed to the use ofmultiple communication points (e.g., ingress points and egress points).Furthermore, implementing unified communication resources may provideimproved security, by limiting the number of access points to secureshell instances and core cloud services.

In some embodiments, as described in more detail in reference to FIG. 2, the example system 600 may include two or more root compartments,associated with different blocks of IP addresses. For example, a privateroot compartment 620 may include a regional jump host virtual cloudnetwork (VCN) 630, a regional service VCN 640, and a regional computeisolation VCN 650. Similarly, a public root compartment 660 may includea regional network isolation VCN 670 configured to connect to anexternal network (e.g., external network 180 of FIG. 1 ) via a regionalnetwork address translation (NAT) gateway 680, and to core cloudservices via a regional service gateway 682.

In some embodiments, the jump host VCN 630 may be include a regionalnetwork gateway 632 (NET), which may permit network traffic between theconstituent networks of the private root compartment 620 with externalnetworks (e.g., the internet, a private user network, etc.). Forexample, a command may be received from the user device 120 via theregional network gateway 632. In some embodiments, the jump host VCN 630may be configured to send the command to a regional router subnet 642running on the regional service VCN 640. The regional router subnet 642may direct the command to the pool subnet 652, addressed to a secureshell instance (e.g., secure shell instance 150 of FIG. 1 ) running in apool of instances 654. In some embodiments, each domain 610 may includea pool of instances 654, running on the pool subnet 652. The pools 654may, in turn, include multiple secure shell instances associated withsecure shells created for users of the IaaS secure shell service. Eachsecure shell instance may include multiple virtual network interfacecards (vNICs), as described in more detail in reference to the precedingfigures.

In some embodiments, output messages from instances running on the poolsubnet 652 in the compute isolation VCN 650 may be directed to theregional shell subnet 672 running on the network isolation VCN 670. Bycontrast, return messages, addressed to user devices, may be directed tothe router subnet 642 running on the service VCN 640. The regionalsubnets may direct the messages to the external addressees via theappropriate gateways.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example flow 700 for utilizing multiple networkinterfaces for a secure shell instance, in accordance with one or moreembodiments. The operations of the flow can be implemented as hardwarecircuitry and/or stored as computer-readable instructions on anon-transitory computer-readable medium of a computer system, such asthe secure shell instance 150 of FIG. 1 . As implemented, theinstructions represent modules that include circuitry or code executableby a processor(s) of the computer system. The execution of suchinstructions configures the computer system to perform the specificoperations described herein. Each circuitry or code in combination withthe processor performs the respective operation(s). While the operationsare illustrated in a particular order, it should be understood that noparticular order is necessary and that one or more operations may beomitted, skipped, and/or reordered.

In an example, the flow 700 includes an operation 702, where thecomputer system receives a command to execute an operation via a primaryvirtual network interface card (vNIC). As described in more detail inreference to FIG. 1 and FIGS. 3-4 , above, the primary vNIC (e.g.,primary vNIC 140 of FIG. 1 ) may be configured during the creationand/or specialization of the secure cloud instance (e.g., secure cloudinstance 150 of FIG. 1 ) with security rules. The security rules maycontrol network traffic to the secure shell instance, such that theprimary vNIC may be configured to be ingress-only with respect to one ormore types of network traffic. For example, the primary vNIC may beconfigured to limit network traffic between the secure shell instanceand external systems (e.g., core cloud services, external networkdevices, etc.) such that the secure shell instance may receive incomingtraffic via the primary vNIC, but may not send outgoing traffic via theprimary vNIC.

In an example, the flow 700 includes an operation 704, where thecomputer system executes the operation. The secure shell instance may bea virtual machine (VM), hosted on a virtual cloud network (VCN), asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 2 , above. As such, thesecure shell instance may include compute resources (e.g., cores,threads, etc.) and may include data storage (e.g., block volumes, etc.).In some cases, the secure shell instance may be configured to executecommands received via a secure shell (e.g., a terminal, bash shell,etc.) created to securely connect a user of a user device (e.g., userdevice 120 of FIG. 1 ) to the secure shell instance, for example, overan encrypted connection (e.g., a WebSocket Secure connection).

In an example, the flow 700 includes an operation 706, where thecomputer system generates an output of the operation. In someembodiments, the output may include moving data, sending requestedinformation, and/or other types of output from the secure shellinstance. Considering that such output may include confidentialinformation, implementing network traffic controls may potentiallyreduce the risk of misdirecting the output to an unauthorized addressee.

In an example, the flow 700 includes an operation 708, where thecomputer system transmits a message comprising the output of theoperation to a shell subnet via a secondary virtual network interfacecard (e.g., secondary vNIC 160 of FIG. 1 ). The secondary vNIC may beconfigured with security rules defining a unidirectional limitation onnetwork traffic, for example, for sending output from the secure shellinstance to a shell subnet (e.g., shell subnet 170). As described inmore detail in reference to FIG. 2 , the shell subnet and the secureshell instance may run in different VCNs, isolated from one another,which may potentially improve communication security.

FIG. 8 illustrates an example flow 800 for bi-directional communicationwith a secure shell instance using a network interface, in accordancewith one or more embodiments. The operations of the flow can beimplemented as hardware circuitry and/or stored as computer-readableinstructions on a non-transitory computer-readable medium of a computersystem, such as the secure shell instance 150 of FIG. 1 . Asimplemented, the instructions represent modules that include circuitryor code executable by a processor(s) of the computer system. Theexecution of such instructions configures the computer system to performthe specific operations described herein. Each circuitry or code incombination with the processor performs the respective operation(s).While the operations are illustrated in a particular order, it should beunderstood that no particular order is necessary and that one or moreoperations may be omitted, skipped, and/or reordered.

In an example, the flow 800 begins following operation 704 of FIG. 7 ,where the computer system executes the operation. In particular, thecomputer system (e.g., the secure shell instance 150 of FIG. 1 ), mayimplement one or more operations associated with communication ofoperation output as described in reference to the operations describedin FIG. 8 .

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 802, where thecomputer system generates a return message for the user device. asdescribed in more detail in reference to FIG. 1 and FIG. 4 , the secureshell instance may generate a return message as part of executing theoperation. The return message may be a message for the user device(e.g., user device 120 of FIG. 1 ). For example, the return message maybe a confirmation, a status, or a checkbit, that may have been includedas part of the command received from the user device.

In an example, the flow 800 includes an operation 804, where thecomputer system transmits the return message to the router via theprimary virtual network interface card (e.g., primary vNIC 140 of FIG. 1). As described in more detail in reference to FIG. 4 , the primary vNICmay be configured for unidirectional network traffic, allowing inboundtraffic to reach the secure shell instance, but not allowing outboundtraffic from the secure shell instance to the IaaS services (e.g., thecloud shell router 130 of FIG. 1 ). In some embodiments, the primaryvNIC may be configured to permit the return message to be sent to thecloud shell router, to be sent to the user device via one or moreelements running in the service VCN (e.g., service VCN 210 of FIG. 2 )

FIG. 9 illustrates an example flow 900 for bi-directional communicationwith a secure shell instance using a network interface, in accordancewith one or more embodiments. The operations of the flow can beimplemented as hardware circuitry and/or stored as computer-readableinstructions on a non-transitory computer-readable medium of a computersystem, such as the secure shell instance 150 of FIG. 1 . Asimplemented, the instructions represent modules that include circuitryor code executable by a processor(s) of the computer system. Theexecution of such instructions configures the computer system to performthe specific operations described herein. Each circuitry or code incombination with the processor performs the respective operation(s).While the operations are illustrated in a particular order, it should beunderstood that no particular order is necessary and that one or moreoperations may be omitted, skipped, and/or reordered.

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 902, where thecomputer system receives an external network request via a secondaryvirtual network interface card (vNIC). As described in more detail inreference to the preceding paragraphs, the secondary vNIC (e.g.,secondary vNIC 160 of FIG. 1 ) may be configured for unidirectionalnetwork traffic from the secure shell instance (e.g., throughconfiguration of security rules during setup of the secure shellinstance). As such, in cases where an external network request reachesthe secondary vNIC, it may be that the request is unauthorized or waserroneously addressed to the secondary vNIC.

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 904, where thecomputer system rejects the external network request. The secondary vNICmay, in some cases, be configured to reject incoming network requests.For example, the security rules included in the configuration of thesecondary vNIC may define the secondary vNIC as unidirectional withoutexception.

In an example, the flow 900 includes an operation 906, where thecomputer system returns an error message. In some embodiments, returningan error message may be accompanied by storing identifier informationdescribing the external network request (e.g., username, logincredentials, IP address, etc.) for potential use by IaaS securityservices. For example, an audit of unauthorized inbound network trafficmay help to identify whether one or more IaaS services and/or userinstances may have been compromised. In some embodiments, the errormessage may be directed to an IaaS security service directly, forexample, as a notification that an unauthorized inbound request wasreceived at the secondary vNIC (being egress-only).

As noted above, infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is one particulartype of cloud computing. IaaS can be configured to provide virtualizedcomputing resources over a public network (e.g., the Internet). In anIaaS model, a cloud computing provider can host the infrastructurecomponents (e.g., servers, storage devices, network nodes (e.g.,hardware), deployment software, platform virtualization (e.g., ahypervisor layer), or the like). In some cases, an IaaS provider mayalso supply a variety of services to accompany those infrastructurecomponents (e.g., billing, monitoring, logging, security, load balancingand clustering, etc.). Thus, as these services may be policy-driven,IaaS users may be able to implement policies to drive load balancing tomaintain application availability and performance.

In some instances, IaaS customers may access resources and servicesthrough a wide area network (WAN), such as the Internet, and can use thecloud provider's services to install the remaining elements of anapplication stack. For example, the user can log in to the IaaS platformto create virtual machines (VMs), install operating systems (OSs) oneach VM, deploy middleware such as databases, create storage buckets forworkloads and backups, and even install enterprise software into thatVM. Customers can then use the provider's services to perform variousfunctions, including balancing network traffic, troubleshootingapplication issues, monitoring performance, managing disaster recovery,etc.

In most cases, a cloud computing model will require the participation ofa cloud provider. The cloud provider may, but need not be, a third-partyservice that specializes in providing (e.g., offering, renting, selling)IaaS. An entity might also opt to deploy a private cloud, becoming itsown provider of infrastructure services.

In some examples, IaaS deployment is the process of putting a newapplication, or a new version of an application, onto a preparedapplication server or the like. It may also include the process ofpreparing the server (e.g., installing libraries, daemons, etc.). Thisis often managed by the cloud provider, below the hypervisor layer(e.g., the servers, storage, network hardware, and virtualization).Thus, the customer may be responsible for handling (OS), middleware,and/or application deployment (e.g., on self-service virtual machines(e.g., that can be spun up on demand) or the like.

In some examples, IaaS provisioning may refer to acquiring computers orvirtual hosts for use, and even installing needed libraries or serviceson them. In most cases, deployment does not include provisioning, andthe provisioning may need to be performed first.

In some cases, there are two different problems for IaaS provisioning.First, there is the initial challenge of provisioning the initial set ofinfrastructure before anything is running. Second, there is thechallenge of evolving the existing infrastructure (e.g., adding newservices, changing services, removing services, etc.) once everythinghas been provisioned. In some cases, these two challenges may beaddressed by enabling the configuration of the infrastructure to bedefined declaratively. In other words, the infrastructure (e.g., whatcomponents are needed and how they interact) can be defined by one ormore configuration files. Thus, the overall topology of theinfrastructure (e.g., what resources depend on which, and how they eachwork together) can be described declaratively. In some instances, oncethe topology is defined, a workflow can be generated that creates and/ormanages the different components described in the configuration files.

In some examples, an infrastructure may have many interconnectedelements. For example, there may be one or more virtual private clouds(VPCs) (e.g., a potentially on-demand pool of configurable and/or sharedcomputing resources), also known as a core network. In some examples,there may also be one or more security group rules provisioned to definehow the security of the network will be set up and one or more virtualmachines (VMs). Other infrastructure elements may also be provisioned,such as a load balancer, a database, or the like. As more and moreinfrastructure elements are desired and/or added, the infrastructure mayincrementally evolve.

In some instances, continuous deployment techniques may be employed toenable deployment of infrastructure code across various virtualcomputing environments. Additionally, the described techniques canenable infrastructure management within these environments. In someexamples, service teams can write code that is desired to be deployed toone or more, but often many, different production environments (e.g.,across various different geographic locations, sometimes spanning theentire world). However, in some examples, the infrastructure on whichthe code will be deployed must first be set up. In some instances, theprovisioning can be done manually, a provisioning tool may be utilizedto provision the resources, and/or deployment tools may be utilized todeploy the code once the infrastructure is provisioned.

FIG. 10 is a block diagram 1000 illustrating an example pattern of anIaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1002 can be communicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy1004 that can include a virtual cloud network (VCN) 1006 and a securehost subnet 1008. In some examples, the service operators 1002 may beusing one or more client computing devices, which may be portablehandheld devices (e.g., an iPhone®, cellular telephone, an iPad®,computing tablet, a personal digital assistant (PDA)) or wearabledevices (e.g., a Google Glass® head mounted display), running softwaresuch as Microsoft Windows Mobile®, and/or a variety of mobile operatingsystems such as iOS, Windows Phone, Android, BlackBerry 8, Palm OS, andthe like, and being Internet, e-mail, short message service (SMS),Blackberry®, or other communication protocol enabled. Alternatively, theclient computing devices can be general purpose personal computersincluding, by way of example, personal computers and/or laptop computersrunning various versions of Microsoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/orLinux operating systems. The client computing devices can be workstationcomputers running any of a variety of commercially-available UNIX® orUNIX-like operating systems, including without limitation the variety ofGNU/Linux operating systems, such as for example, Google Chrome OS.Alternatively, or in addition, client computing devices may be any otherelectronic device, such as a thin-client computer, an Internet-enabledgaming system (e.g., a Microsoft Xbox gaming console with or without aKinect® gesture input device), and/or a personal messaging device,capable of communicating over a network that can access the VCN 1006and/or the Internet.

The VCN 1006 can include a local peering gateway (LPG) 1010 that can becommunicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 1012 via an LPG 1010contained in the SSH VCN 1012. The SSH VCN 1012 can include an SSHsubnet 1014, and the SSH VCN 1012 can be communicatively coupled to acontrol plane VCN 1016 via the LPG 1010 contained in the control planeVCN 1016. Also, the SSH VCN 1012 can be communicatively coupled to adata plane VCN 1018 via an LPG 1010. The control plane VCN 1016 and thedata plane VCN 1018 can be contained in a service tenancy 1019 that canbe owned and/or operated by the IaaS provider.

The control plane VCN 1016 can include a control plane demilitarizedzone (DMZ) tier 1020 that acts as a perimeter network (e.g., portions ofa corporate network between the corporate intranet and externalnetworks). The DMZ-based servers may have restricted responsibilitiesand help keep security breaches contained. Additionally, the DMZ tier1020 can include one or more load balancer (LB) subnet(s) 1022, acontrol plane app tier 1024 that can include app subnet(s) 1026, acontrol plane data tier 1028 that can include database (DB) subnet(s)1030 (e.g., frontend DB subnet(s) and/or backend DB subnet(s)). The LBsubnet(s) 1022 contained in the control plane DMZ tier 1020 can becommunicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1026 contained in thecontrol plane app tier 1024 and an Internet gateway 1034 that can becontained in the control plane VCN 1016, and the app subnet(s) 1026 canbe communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1030 contained in thecontrol plane data tier 1028 and a service gateway 1036 and a networkaddress translation (NAT) gateway 1038. The control plane VCN 1016 caninclude the service gateway 1036 and the NAT gateway 1038.

The control plane VCN 1016 can include a data plane mirror app tier 1040that can include app subnet(s) 1026. The app subnet(s) 1026 contained inthe data plane mirror app tier 1040 can include a virtual networkinterface controller (VNIC) 1042 that can execute a compute instance1044. The compute instance 1044 can communicatively couple the appsubnet(s) 1026 of the data plane mirror app tier 1040 to app subnet(s)1026 that can be contained in a data plane app tier 1046.

The data plane VCN 1018 can include the data plane app tier 1046, a dataplane DMZ tier 1048, and a data plane data tier 1050. The data plane DMZtier 1048 can include LB subnet(s) 1022 that can be communicativelycoupled to the app subnet(s) 1026 of the data plane app tier 1046 andthe Internet gateway 1034 of the data plane VCN 1018. The app subnet(s)1026 can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway 1036 of thedata plane VCN 1018 and the NAT gateway 1038 of the data plane VCN 1018.The data plane data tier 1050 can also include the DB subnet(s) 1030that can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1026 of thedata plane app tier 1046.

The Internet gateway 1034 of the control plane VCN 1016 and of the dataplane VCN 1018 can be communicatively coupled to a metadata managementservice 1052 that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet1054. Public Internet 1054 can be communicatively coupled to the NATgateway 1038 of the control plane VCN 1016 and of the data plane VCN1018. The service gateway 1036 of the control plane VCN 1016 and of thedata plane VCN 1018 can be communicatively couple to cloud services1056.

In some examples, the service gateway 1036 of the control plane VCN 1016or of the data plan VCN 1018 can make application programming interface(API) calls to cloud services 1056 without going through public Internet1054. The API calls to cloud services 1056 from the service gateway 1036can be one-way: the service gateway 1036 can make API calls to cloudservices 1056, and cloud services 1056 can send requested data to theservice gateway 1036. But, cloud services 1056 may not initiate APIcalls to the service gateway 1036.

In some examples, the secure host tenancy 1004 can be directly connectedto the service tenancy 1019, which may be otherwise isolated. The securehost subnet 1008 can communicate with the SSH subnet 1014 through an LPG1010 that may enable two-way communication over an otherwise isolatedsystem. Connecting the secure host subnet 1008 to the SSH subnet 1014may give the secure host subnet 1008 access to other entities within theservice tenancy 1019.

The control plane VCN 1016 may allow users of the service tenancy 1019to set up or otherwise provision desired resources. Desired resourcesprovisioned in the control plane VCN 1016 may be deployed or otherwiseused in the data plane VCN 1018. In some examples, the control plane VCN1016 can be isolated from the data plane VCN 1018, and the data planemirror app tier 1040 of the control plane VCN 1016 can communicate withthe data plane app tier 1046 of the data plane VCN 1018 via VNICs 1042that can be contained in the data plane mirror app tier 1040 and thedata plane app tier 1046.

In some examples, users of the system, or customers, can make requests,for example create, read, update, or delete (CRUD) operations, throughpublic Internet 1054 that can communicate the requests to the metadatamanagement service 1052. The metadata management service 1052 cancommunicate the request to the control plane VCN 1016 through theInternet gateway 1034. The request can be received by the LB subnet(s)1022 contained in the control plane DMZ tier 1020. The LB subnet(s) 1022may determine that the request is valid, and in response to thisdetermination, the LB subnet(s) 1022 can transmit the request to appsubnet(s) 1026 contained in the control plane app tier 1024. If therequest is validated and requires a call to public Internet 1054, thecall to public Internet 1054 may be transmitted to the NAT gateway 1038that can make the call to public Internet 1054. Memory that may bedesired to be stored by the request can be stored in the DB subnet(s)1030.

In some examples, the data plane mirror app tier 1040 can facilitatedirect communication between the control plane VCN 1016 and the dataplane VCN 1018. For example, changes, updates, or other suitablemodifications to configuration may be desired to be applied to theresources contained in the data plane VCN 1018. Via a VNIC 1042, thecontrol plane VCN 1016 can directly communicate with, and can therebyexecute the changes, updates, or other suitable modifications toconfiguration to, resources contained in the data plane VCN 1018.

In some embodiments, the control plane VCN 1016 and the data plane VCN1018 can be contained in the service tenancy 1019. In this case, theuser, or the customer, of the system may not own or operate either thecontrol plane VCN 1016 or the data plane VCN 1018. Instead, the IaaSprovider may own or operate the control plane VCN 1016 and the dataplane VCN 1018, both of which may be contained in the service tenancy1019. This embodiment can enable isolation of networks that may preventusers or customers from interacting with other users', or othercustomers', resources. Also, this embodiment may allow users orcustomers of the system to store databases privately without needing torely on public Internet 1054, which may not have a desired level ofsecurity, for storage.

In other embodiments, the LB subnet(s) 1022 contained in the controlplane VCN 1016 can be configured to receive a signal from the servicegateway 1036. In this embodiment, the control plane VCN 1016 and thedata plane VCN 1018 may be configured to be called by a customer of theIaaS provider without calling public Internet 1054. Customers of theIaaS provider may desire this embodiment since database(s) that thecustomers use may be controlled by the IaaS provider and may be storedon the service tenancy 1019, which may be isolated from public Internet1054.

FIG. 11 is a block diagram 1100 illustrating another example pattern ofan IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1102 (e.g. service operators 1002 of FIG. 10 ) can becommunicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1104 (e.g. the securehost tenancy 1004 of FIG. 10 ) that can include a virtual cloud network(VCN) 1106 (e.g. the VCN 1006 of FIG. 10 ) and a secure host subnet 1108(e.g. the secure host subnet 1008 of FIG. 10 ). The VCN 1106 can includea local peering gateway (LPG) 1110 (e.g. the LPG 1010 of FIG. 10 ) thatcan be communicatively coupled to a secure shell (SSH) VCN 1112 (e.g.the SSH VCN 1012 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1010 contained in the SSH VCN1112. The SSH VCN 1112 can include an SSH subnet 1114 (e.g. the SSHsubnet 1014 of FIG. 10 ), and the SSH VCN 1112 can be communicativelycoupled to a control plane VCN 1116 (e.g. the control plane VCN 1016 ofFIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1110 contained in the control plane VCN 1116. Thecontrol plane VCN 1116 can be contained in a service tenancy 1119 (e.g.the service tenancy 1019 of FIG. 10 ), and the data plane VCN 1118 (e.g.the data plane VCN 1018 of FIG. 10 ) can be contained in a customertenancy 1121 that may be owned or operated by users, or customers, ofthe system.

The control plane VCN 1116 can include a control plane DMZ tier 1120(e.g. the control plane DMZ tier 1020 of FIG. 10 ) that can include LBsubnet(s) 1122 (e.g. LB subnet(s) 1022 of FIG. 10 ), a control plane apptier 1124 (e.g. the control plane app tier 1024 of FIG. 10 ) that caninclude app subnet(s) 1126 (e.g. app subnet(s) 1026 of FIG. 10 ), acontrol plane data tier 1128 (e.g. the control plane data tier 1028 ofFIG. 10 ) that can include database (DB) subnet(s) 1130 (e.g. similar toDB subnet(s) 1030 of FIG. 10 ). The LB subnet(s) 1122 contained in thecontrol plane DMZ tier 1120 can be communicatively coupled to the appsubnet(s) 1126 contained in the control plane app tier 1124 and anInternet gateway 1134 (e.g. the Internet gateway 1034 of FIG. 10 ) thatcan be contained in the control plane VCN 1116, and the app subnet(s)1126 can be communicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1130 containedin the control plane data tier 1128 and a service gateway 1136 (e.g. theservice gateway of FIG. 10 ) and a network address translation (NAT)gateway 1138 (e.g. the NAT gateway 1038 of FIG. 10 ). The control planeVCN 1116 can include the service gateway 1136 and the NAT gateway 1138.

The control plane VCN 1116 can include a data plane mirror app tier 1140(e.g. the data plane mirror app tier 1040 of FIG. 10 ) that can includeapp subnet(s) 1126. The app subnet(s) 1126 contained in the data planemirror app tier 1140 can include a virtual network interface controller(VNIC) 1142 (e.g. the VNIC of 1042) that can execute a compute instance1144 (e.g. similar to the compute instance 1044 of FIG. 10 ). Thecompute instance 1144 can facilitate communication between the appsubnet(s) 1126 of the data plane mirror app tier 1140 and the appsubnet(s) 1126 that can be contained in a data plane app tier 1146 (e.g.the data plane app tier 1046 of FIG. 10 ) via the VNIC 1142 contained inthe data plane mirror app tier 1140 and the VNIC 1142 contained in thedata plan app tier 1146.

The Internet gateway 1134 contained in the control plane VCN 1116 can becommunicatively coupled to a metadata management service 1152 (e.g. themetadata management service 1052 of FIG. 10 ) that can becommunicatively coupled to public Internet 1154 (e.g. public Internet1054 of FIG. 10 ). Public Internet 1154 can be communicatively coupledto the NAT gateway 1138 contained in the control plane VCN 1116. Theservice gateway 1136 contained in the control plane VCN 1116 can becommunicatively couple to cloud services 1156 (e.g. cloud services 1056of FIG. 10 ).

In some examples, the data plane VCN 1118 can be contained in thecustomer tenancy 1121. In this case, the IaaS provider may provide thecontrol plane VCN 1116 for each customer, and the IaaS provider may, foreach customer, set up a unique compute instance 1144 that is containedin the service tenancy 1119. Each compute instance 1144 may allowcommunication between the control plane VCN 1116, contained in theservice tenancy 1119, and the data plane VCN 1118 that is contained inthe customer tenancy 1121. The compute instance 1144 may allowresources, that are provisioned in the control plane VCN 1116 that iscontained in the service tenancy 1119, to be deployed or otherwise usedin the data plane VCN 1118 that is contained in the customer tenancy1121.

In other examples, the customer of the IaaS provider may have databasesthat live in the customer tenancy 1121. In this example, the controlplane VCN 1116 can include the data plane mirror app tier 1140 that caninclude app subnet(s) 1126. The data plane mirror app tier 1140 canreside in the data plane VCN 1118, but the data plane mirror app tier1140 may not live in the data plane VCN 1118. That is, the data planemirror app tier 1140 may have access to the customer tenancy 1121, butthe data plane mirror app tier 1140 may not exist in the data plane VCN1118 or be owned or operated by the customer of the IaaS provider. Thedata plane mirror app tier 1140 may be configured to make calls to thedata plane VCN 1118 but may not be configured to make calls to anyentity contained in the control plane VCN 1116. The customer may desireto deploy or otherwise use resources in the data plane VCN 1118 that areprovisioned in the control plane VCN 1116, and the data plane mirror apptier 1140 can facilitate the desired deployment, or other usage ofresources, of the customer.

In some embodiments, the customer of the IaaS provider can apply filtersto the data plane VCN 1118. In this embodiment, the customer candetermine what the data plane VCN 1118 can access, and the customer mayrestrict access to public Internet 1154 from the data plane VCN 1118.The IaaS provider may not be able to apply filters or otherwise controlaccess of the data plane VCN 1118 to any outside networks or databases.Applying filters and controls by the customer onto the data plane VCN1118, contained in the customer tenancy 1121, can help isolate the dataplane VCN 1118 from other customers and from public Internet 1154.

In some embodiments, cloud services 1156 can be called by the servicegateway 1136 to access services that may not exist on public Internet1154, on the control plane VCN 1116, or on the data plane VCN 1118. Theconnection between cloud services 1156 and the control plane VCN 1116 orthe data plane VCN 1118 may not be live or continuous. Cloud services1156 may exist on a different network owned or operated by the IaaSprovider. Cloud services 1156 may be configured to receive calls fromthe service gateway 1136 and may be configured to not receive calls frompublic Internet 1154. Some cloud services 1156 may be isolated fromother cloud services 1156, and the control plane VCN 1116 may beisolated from cloud services 1156 that may not be in the same region asthe control plane VCN 1116. For example, the control plane VCN 1116 maybe located in “Region 1,” and cloud service “Deployment 10,” may belocated in Region 1 and in “Region 2.” If a call to Deployment 10 ismade by the service gateway 1136 contained in the control plane VCN 1116located in Region 1, the call may be transmitted to Deployment 10 inRegion 1. In this example, the control plane VCN 1116, or Deployment 10in Region 1, may not be communicatively coupled to, or otherwise incommunication with, Deployment 10 in Region 2.

FIG. 12 is a block diagram 1200 illustrating another example pattern ofan IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1202 (e.g. service operators 1002 of FIG. 10 ) can becommunicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1204 (e.g. the securehost tenancy 1004 of FIG. 10 ) that can include a virtual cloud network(VCN) 1206 (e.g. the VCN 1006 of FIG. 10 ) and a secure host subnet 1208(e.g. the secure host subnet 1008 of FIG. 10 ). The VCN 1206 can includean LPG 1210 (e.g. the LPG 1010 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicativelycoupled to an SSH VCN 1212 (e.g. the SSH VCN 1012 of FIG. 10 ) via anLPG 1210 contained in the SSH VCN 1212. The SSH VCN 1212 can include anSSH subnet 1214 (e.g. the SSH subnet 1014 of FIG. 10 ), and the SSH VCN1212 can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN 1216 (e.g.the control plane VCN 1016 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1210 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1216 and to a data plane VCN 1218 (e.g. the data plane1018 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1210 contained in the data plane VCN 1218.The control plane VCN 1216 and the data plane VCN 1218 can be containedin a service tenancy 1219 (e.g. the service tenancy 1019 of FIG. 10 ).

The control plane VCN 1216 can include a control plane DMZ tier 1220(e.g. the control plane DMZ tier 1020 of FIG. 10 ) that can include loadbalancer (LB) subnet(s) 1222 (e.g. LB subnet(s) 1022 of FIG. 10 ), acontrol plane app tier 1224 (e.g. the control plane app tier 1024 ofFIG. 10 ) that can include app subnet(s) 1226 (e.g. similar to appsubnet(s) 1026 of FIG. 10 ), a control plane data tier 1228 (e.g. thecontrol plane data tier 1028 of FIG. 10 ) that can include DB subnet(s)1230. The LB subnet(s) 1222 contained in the control plane DMZ tier 1220can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1226 contained inthe control plane app tier 1224 and to an Internet gateway 1234 (e.g.the Internet gateway 1034 of FIG. 10 ) that can be contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1216, and the app subnet(s) 1226 can becommunicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1230 contained in thecontrol plane data tier 1228 and to a service gateway 1236 (e.g. theservice gateway of FIG. 10 ) and a network address translation (NAT)gateway 1238 (e.g. the NAT gateway 1038 of FIG. 10 ). The control planeVCN 1216 can include the service gateway 1236 and the NAT gateway 1238.

The data plane VCN 1218 can include a data plane app tier 1246 (e.g. thedata plane app tier 1046 of FIG. 10 ), a data plane DMZ tier 1248 (e.g.the data plane DMZ tier 1048 of FIG. 10 ), and a data plane data tier1250 (e.g. the data plane data tier 1050 of FIG. 10 ). The data planeDMZ tier 1248 can include LB subnet(s) 1222 that can be communicativelycoupled to trusted app subnet(s) 1260 and untrusted app subnet(s) 1262of the data plane app tier 1246 and the Internet gateway 1234 containedin the data plane VCN 1218. The trusted app subnet(s) 1260 can becommunicatively coupled to the service gateway 1236 contained in thedata plane VCN 1218, the NAT gateway 1238 contained in the data planeVCN 1218, and DB subnet(s) 1230 contained in the data plane data tier1250. The untrusted app subnet(s) 1262 can be communicatively coupled tothe service gateway 1236 contained in the data plane VCN 1218 and DBsubnet(s) 1230 contained in the data plane data tier 1250. The dataplane data tier 1250 can include DB subnet(s) 1230 that can becommunicatively coupled to the service gateway 1236 contained in thedata plane VCN 1218.

The untrusted app subnet(s) 1262 can include one or more primary VNICs1264(1)-(N) that can be communicatively coupled to tenant virtualmachines (VMs) 1266(1)-(N). Each tenant VM 1266(1)-(N) can becommunicatively coupled to a respective app subnet 1267(1)-(N) that canbe contained in respective container egress VCNs 1268(1)-(N) that can becontained in respective customer tenancies 1270(1)-(N). Respectivesecondary VNICs 1272(1)-(N) can facilitate communication between theuntrusted app subnet(s) 1262 contained in the data plane VCN 1218 andthe app subnet contained in the container egress VCNs 1268(1)-(N). Eachcontainer egress VCNs 1268(1)-(N) can include a NAT gateway 1238 thatcan be communicatively coupled to public Internet 1254 (e.g. publicInternet 1054 of FIG. 10 ).

The Internet gateway 1234 contained in the control plane VCN 1216 andcontained in the data plane VCN 1218 can be communicatively coupled to ametadata management service 1252 (e.g. the metadata management system1052 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet1254. Public Internet 1254 can be communicatively coupled to the NATgateway 1238 contained in the control plane VCN 1216 and contained inthe data plane VCN 1218. The service gateway 1236 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1216 and contained in the data plane VCN 1218 can becommunicatively couple to cloud services 1256.

In some embodiments, the data plane VCN 1218 can be integrated withcustomer tenancies 1270. This integration can be useful or desirable forcustomers of the IaaS provider in some cases such as a case that maydesire support when executing code. The customer may provide code to runthat may be destructive, may communicate with other customer resources,or may otherwise cause undesirable effects. In response to this, theIaaS provider may determine whether to run code given to the IaaSprovider by the customer.

In some examples, the customer of the IaaS provider may grant temporarynetwork access to the IaaS provider and request a function to beattached to the data plane tier app 1246. Code to run the function maybe executed in the VMs 1266(1)-(N), and the code may not be configuredto run anywhere else on the data plane VCN 1218. Each VM 1266(1)-(N) maybe connected to one customer tenancy 1270. Respective containers1271(1)-(N) contained in the VMs 1266(1)-(N) may be configured to runthe code. In this case, there can be a dual isolation (e.g., thecontainers 1271(1)-(N) running code, where the containers 1271(1)-(N)may be contained in at least the VM 1266(1)-(N) that are contained inthe untrusted app subnet(s) 1262), which may help prevent incorrect orotherwise undesirable code from damaging the network of the IaaSprovider or from damaging a network of a different customer. Thecontainers 1271(1)-(N) may be communicatively coupled to the customertenancy 1270 and may be configured to transmit or receive data from thecustomer tenancy 1270. The containers 1271(1)-(N) may not be configuredto transmit or receive data from any other entity in the data plane VCN1218. Upon completion of running the code, the IaaS provider may kill orotherwise dispose of the containers 1271(1)-(N).

In some embodiments, the trusted app subnet(s) 1260 may run code thatmay be owned or operated by the IaaS provider. In this embodiment, thetrusted app subnet(s) 1260 may be communicatively coupled to the DBsubnet(s) 1230 and be configured to execute CRUD operations in the DBsubnet(s) 1230. The untrusted app subnet(s) 1262 may be communicativelycoupled to the DB subnet(s) 1230, but in this embodiment, the untrustedapp subnet(s) may be configured to execute read operations in the DBsubnet(s) 1230. The containers 1271(1)-(N) that can be contained in theVM 1266(1)-(N) of each customer and that may run code from the customermay not be communicatively coupled with the DB subnet(s) 1230.

In other embodiments, the control plane VCN 1216 and the data plane VCN1218 may not be directly communicatively coupled. In this embodiment,there may be no direct communication between the control plane VCN 1216and the data plane VCN 1218. However, communication can occur indirectlythrough at least one method. An LPG 1210 may be established by the IaaSprovider that can facilitate communication between the control plane VCN1216 and the data plane VCN 1218. In another example, the control planeVCN 1216 or the data plane VCN 1218 can make a call to cloud services1256 via the service gateway 1236. For example, a call to cloud services1256 from the control plane VCN 1216 can include a request for a servicethat can communicate with the data plane VCN 1218.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram 1300 illustrating another example pattern ofan IaaS architecture, according to at least one embodiment. Serviceoperators 1302 (e.g. service operators 1002 of FIG. 10 ) can becommunicatively coupled to a secure host tenancy 1304 (e.g. the securehost tenancy 1004 of FIG. 10 ) that can include a virtual cloud network(VCN) 1306 (e.g. the VCN 1006 of FIG. 10 ) and a secure host subnet 1308(e.g. the secure host subnet 1008 of FIG. 10 ). The VCN 1306 can includean LPG 1310 (e.g. the LPG 1010 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicativelycoupled to an SSH VCN 1312 (e.g. the SSH VCN 1012 of FIG. 10 ) via anLPG 1310 contained in the SSH VCN 1312. The SSH VCN 1312 can include anSSH subnet 1314 (e.g. the SSH subnet 1014 of FIG. 10 ), and the SSH VCN1312 can be communicatively coupled to a control plane VCN 1316 (e.g.the control plane VCN 1016 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1310 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1316 and to a data plane VCN 1318 (e.g. the data plane1018 of FIG. 10 ) via an LPG 1310 contained in the data plane VCN 1318.The control plane VCN 1316 and the data plane VCN 1318 can be containedin a service tenancy 1319 (e.g. the service tenancy 1019 of FIG. 10 ).

The control plane VCN 1316 can include a control plane DMZ tier 1320(e.g. the control plane DMZ tier 1020 of FIG. 10 ) that can include LBsubnet(s) 1322 (e.g. LB subnet(s) 1022 of FIG. 10 ), a control plane apptier 1324 (e.g. the control plane app tier 1024 of FIG. 10 ) that caninclude app subnet(s) 1326 (e.g. app subnet(s) 1026 of FIG. 10 ), acontrol plane data tier 1328 (e.g. the control plane data tier 1028 ofFIG. 10 ) that can include DB subnet(s) 1330 (e.g. DB subnet(s) 1230 ofFIG. 12 ). The LB subnet(s) 1322 contained in the control plane DMZ tier1320 can be communicatively coupled to the app subnet(s) 1326 containedin the control plane app tier 1324 and to an Internet gateway 1334 (e.g.the Internet gateway 1034 of FIG. 10 ) that can be contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1316, and the app subnet(s) 1326 can becommunicatively coupled to the DB subnet(s) 1330 contained in thecontrol plane data tier 1328 and to a service gateway 1336 (e.g. theservice gateway of FIG. 10 ) and a network address translation (NAT)gateway 1338 (e.g. the NAT gateway 1038 of FIG. 10 ). The control planeVCN 1316 can include the service gateway 1336 and the NAT gateway 1338.

The data plane VCN 1318 can include a data plane app tier 1346 (e.g. thedata plane app tier 1046 of FIG. 10 ), a data plane DMZ tier 1348 (e.g.the data plane DMZ tier 1048 of FIG. 10 ), and a data plane data tier1350 (e.g. the data plane data tier 1050 of FIG. 10 ). The data planeDMZ tier 1348 can include LB subnet(s) 1322 that can be communicativelycoupled to trusted app subnet(s) 1360 (e.g. trusted app subnet(s) 1260of FIG. 12 ) and untrusted app subnet(s) 1362 (e.g. untrusted appsubnet(s) 1262 of FIG. 12 ) of the data plane app tier 1346 and theInternet gateway 1334 contained in the data plane VCN 1318. The trustedapp subnet(s) 1360 can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway1336 contained in the data plane VCN 1318, the NAT gateway 1338contained in the data plane VCN 1318, and DB subnet(s) 1330 contained inthe data plane data tier 1350. The untrusted app subnet(s) 1362 can becommunicatively coupled to the service gateway 1336 contained in thedata plane VCN 1318 and DB subnet(s) 1330 contained in the data planedata tier 1350. The data plane data tier 1350 can include DB subnet(s)1330 that can be communicatively coupled to the service gateway 1336contained in the data plane VCN 1318.

The untrusted app subnet(s) 1362 can include primary VNICs 1364(1)-(N)that can be communicatively coupled to tenant virtual machines (VMs)1366(1)-(N) residing within the untrusted app subnet(s) 1362. Eachtenant VM 1366(1)-(N) can run code in a respective container1367(1)-(N), and be communicatively coupled to an app subnet 1326 thatcan be contained in a data plane app tier 1346 that can be contained ina container egress VCN 1368. Respective secondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) canfacilitate communication between the untrusted app subnet(s) 1362contained in the data plane VCN 1318 and the app subnet contained in thecontainer egress VCN 1368. The container egress VCN can include a NATgateway 1338 that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet 1354(e.g. public Internet 1054 of FIG. 10 ).

The Internet gateway 1334 contained in the control plane VCN 1316 andcontained in the data plane VCN 1318 can be communicatively coupled to ametadata management service 1352 (e.g. the metadata management system1052 of FIG. 10 ) that can be communicatively coupled to public Internet1354. Public Internet 1354 can be communicatively coupled to the NATgateway 1338 contained in the control plane VCN 1316 and contained inthe data plane VCN 1318. The service gateway 1336 contained in thecontrol plane VCN 1316 and contained in the data plane VCN 1318 can becommunicatively couple to cloud services 1356.

In some examples, the pattern illustrated by the architecture of blockdiagram 1300 of FIG. 13 may be considered an exception to the patternillustrated by the architecture of block diagram 1200 of FIG. 12 and maybe desirable for a customer of the IaaS provider if the IaaS providercannot directly communicate with the customer (e.g., a disconnectedregion). The respective containers 1367(1)-(N) that are contained in theVMs 1366(1)-(N) for each customer can be accessed in real-time by thecustomer. The containers 1367(1)-(N) may be configured to make calls torespective secondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) contained in app subnet(s) 1326of the data plane app tier 1346 that can be contained in the containeregress VCN 1368. The secondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) can transmit the callsto the NAT gateway 1338 that may transmit the calls to public Internet1354. In this example, the containers 1367(1)-(N) that can be accessedin real-time by the customer can be isolated from the control plane VCN1316 and can be isolated from other entities contained in the data planeVCN 1318. The containers 1367(1)-(N) may also be isolated from resourcesfrom other customers.

In other examples, the customer can use the containers 1367(1)-(N) tocall cloud services 1356. In this example, the customer may run code inthe containers 1367(1)-(N) that requests a service from cloud services1356. The containers 1367(1)-(N) can transmit this request to thesecondary VNICs 1372(1)-(N) that can transmit the request to the NATgateway that can transmit the request to public Internet 1354. PublicInternet 1354 can transmit the request to LB subnet(s) 1322 contained inthe control plane VCN 1316 via the Internet gateway 1334. In response todetermining the request is valid, the LB subnet(s) can transmit therequest to app subnet(s) 1326 that can transmit the request to cloudservices 1356 via the service gateway 1336.

It should be appreciated that IaaS architectures 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300depicted in the figures may have other components than those depicted.Further, the embodiments shown in the figures are only some examples ofa cloud infrastructure system that may incorporate an embodiment of thedisclosure. In some other embodiments, the IaaS systems may have more orfewer components than shown in the figures, may combine two or morecomponents, or may have a different configuration or arrangement ofcomponents.

In certain embodiments, the IaaS systems described herein may include asuite of applications, middleware, and database service offerings thatare delivered to a customer in a self-service, subscription-based,elastically scalable, reliable, highly available, and secure manner. Anexample of such an IaaS system is the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI)provided by the present assignee.

FIG. 14 illustrates an example computer system 1400, in which variousembodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented. The system1400 may be used to implement any of the computer systems describedabove. As shown in the figure, computer system 1400 includes aprocessing unit 1404 that communicates with a number of peripheralsubsystems via a bus subsystem 1402. These peripheral subsystems mayinclude a processing acceleration unit 1406, an I/O subsystem 1408, astorage subsystem 1418 and a communications subsystem 1424. Storagesubsystem 1418 includes tangible computer-readable storage media 1422and a system memory 1410.

Bus subsystem 1402 provides a mechanism for letting the variouscomponents and subsystems of computer system 1400 communicate with eachother as intended. Although bus subsystem 1402 is shown schematically asa single bus, alternative embodiments of the bus subsystem may utilizemultiple buses. Bus subsystem 1402 may be any of several types of busstructures including a memory bus or memory controller, a peripheralbus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures. Forexample, such architectures may include an Industry StandardArchitecture (ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MCA) bus, EnhancedISA (EISA) bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) localbus, and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, which can beimplemented as a Mezzanine bus manufactured to the IEEE P1386.1standard.

Processing unit 1404, which can be implemented as one or more integratedcircuits (e.g., a conventional microprocessor or microcontroller),controls the operation of computer system 1400. One or more processorsmay be included in processing unit 1404. These processors may includesingle core or multicore processors. In certain embodiments, processingunit 1404 may be implemented as one or more independent processing units1432 and/or 1434 with single or multicore processors included in eachprocessing unit. In other embodiments, processing unit 1404 may also beimplemented as a quad-core processing unit formed by integrating twodual-core processors into a single chip.

In various embodiments, processing unit 1404 can execute a variety ofprograms in response to program code and can maintain multipleconcurrently executing programs or processes. At any given time, some orall of the program code to be executed can be resident in processor(s)1404 and/or in storage subsystem 1418. Through suitable programming,processor(s) 1404 can provide various functionalities described above.Computer system 1400 may additionally include a processing accelerationunit 1406, which can include a digital signal processor (DSP), aspecial-purpose processor, and/or the like.

I/O subsystem 1408 may include user interface input devices and userinterface output devices. User interface input devices may include akeyboard, pointing devices such as a mouse or trackball, a touchpad ortouch screen incorporated into a display, a scroll wheel, a click wheel,a dial, a button, a switch, a keypad, audio input devices with voicecommand recognition systems, microphones, and other types of inputdevices. User interface input devices may include, for example, motionsensing and/or gesture recognition devices such as the Microsoft Kinect®motion sensor that enables users to control and interact with an inputdevice, such as the Microsoft Xbox® 360 game controller, through anatural user interface using gestures and spoken commands. Userinterface input devices may also include eye gesture recognition devicessuch as the Google Glass® blink detector that detects eye activity(e.g., ‘blinking’ while taking pictures and/or making a menu selection)from users and transforms the eye gestures as input into an input device(e.g., Google Glass®). Additionally, user interface input devices mayinclude voice recognition sensing devices that enable users to interactwith voice recognition systems (e.g., Siri® navigator), through voicecommands.

User interface input devices may also include, without limitation, threedimensional (3D) mice, joysticks or pointing sticks, gamepads andgraphic tablets, and audio/visual devices such as speakers, digitalcameras, digital camcorders, portable media players, webcams, imagescanners, fingerprint scanners, barcode reader 3D scanners, 3D printers,laser rangefinders, and eye gaze tracking devices. Additionally, userinterface input devices may include, for example, medical imaging inputdevices such as computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging,position emission tomography, medical ultrasonography devices. Userinterface input devices may also include, for example, audio inputdevices such as MIDI keyboards, digital musical instruments and thelike.

User interface output devices may include a display subsystem, indicatorlights, or non-visual displays such as audio output devices, etc. Thedisplay subsystem may be a cathode ray tube (CRT), a flat-panel device,such as that using a liquid crystal display (LCD) or plasma display, aprojection device, a touch screen, and the like. In general, use of theterm “output device” is intended to include all possible types ofdevices and mechanisms for outputting information from computer system1400 to a user or other computer. For example, user interface outputdevices may include, without limitation, a variety of display devicesthat visually convey text, graphics and audio/video information such asmonitors, printers, speakers, headphones, automotive navigation systems,plotters, voice output devices, and modems.

Computer system 1400 may comprise a storage subsystem 1418 thatcomprises software elements, shown as being currently located within asystem memory 1410. System memory 1410 may store program instructionsthat are loadable and executable on processing unit 1404, as well asdata generated during the execution of these programs.

Depending on the configuration and type of computer system 1400, systemmemory 1410 may be volatile (such as random access memory (RAM)) and/ornon-volatile (such as read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, etc.) TheRAM typically contains data and/or program modules that are immediatelyaccessible to and/or presently being operated and executed by processingunit 1404. In some implementations, system memory 1410 may includemultiple different types of memory, such as static random access memory(SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM). In some implementations,a basic input/output system (BIOS), containing the basic routines thathelp to transfer information between elements within computer system1400, such as during start-up, may typically be stored in the ROM. Byway of example, and not limitation, system memory 1410 also illustratesapplication programs 1412, which may include client applications, Webbrowsers, mid-tier applications, relational database management systems(RDBMS), etc., program data 1414, and an operating system 1416. By wayof example, operating system 1416 may include various versions ofMicrosoft Windows®, Apple Macintosh®, and/or Linux operating systems, avariety of commercially-available UNIX® or UNIX-like operating systems(including without limitation the variety of GNU/Linux operatingsystems, the Google Chrome® OS, and the like) and/or mobile operatingsystems such as iOS, Windows® Phone, Android® OS, BlackBerry® 14 OS, andPalm® OS operating systems.

Storage subsystem 1418 may also provide a tangible computer-readablestorage medium for storing the basic programming and data constructsthat provide the functionality of some embodiments. Software (programs,code modules, instructions) that when executed by a processor providethe functionality described above may be stored in storage subsystem1418. These software modules or instructions may be executed byprocessing unit 1404. Storage subsystem 1418 may also provide arepository for storing data used in accordance with the presentdisclosure.

Storage subsystem 1400 may also include a computer-readable storagemedia reader 1420 that can further be connected to computer-readablestorage media 1422. Together and, optionally, in combination with systemmemory 1410, computer-readable storage media 1422 may comprehensivelyrepresent remote, local, fixed, and/or removable storage devices plusstorage media for temporarily and/or more permanently containing,storing, transmitting, and retrieving computer-readable information.

Computer-readable storage media 1422 containing code, or portions ofcode, can also include any appropriate media known or used in the art,including storage media and communication media, such as but not limitedto, volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable mediaimplemented in any method or technology for storage and/or transmissionof information. This can include tangible computer-readable storagemedia such as RAM, ROM, electronically erasable programmable ROM(EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digitalversatile disk (DVD), or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes,magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices,or other tangible computer readable media. This can also includenontangible computer-readable media, such as data signals, datatransmissions, or any other medium which can be used to transmit thedesired information and which can be accessed by computing system 1400.

By way of example, computer-readable storage media 1422 may include ahard disk drive that reads from or writes to non-removable, nonvolatilemagnetic media, a magnetic disk drive that reads from or writes to aremovable, nonvolatile magnetic disk, and an optical disk drive thatreads from or writes to a removable, nonvolatile optical disk such as aCD ROM, DVD, and Blu-Ray® disk, or other optical media.Computer-readable storage media 1422 may include, but is not limited to,Zip® drives, flash memory cards, universal serial bus (USB) flashdrives, secure digital (SD) cards, DVD disks, digital video tape, andthe like. Computer-readable storage media 1422 may also include,solid-state drives (SSD) based on non-volatile memory such asflash-memory based SSDs, enterprise flash drives, solid state ROM, andthe like, SSDs based on volatile memory such as solid state RAM, dynamicRAM, static RAM, DRAM-based SSDs, magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM) SSDs, andhybrid SSDs that use a combination of DRAM and flash memory based SSDs.The disk drives and their associated computer-readable media may providenon-volatile storage of computer-readable instructions, data structures,program modules, and other data for computer system 1400.

Communications subsystem 1424 provides an interface to other computersystems and networks. Communications subsystem 1424 serves as aninterface for receiving data from and transmitting data to other systemsfrom computer system 1400. For example, communications subsystem 1424may enable computer system 1400 to connect to one or more devices viathe Internet. In some embodiments communications subsystem 1424 caninclude radio frequency (RF) transceiver components for accessingwireless voice and/or data networks (e.g., using cellular telephonetechnology, advanced data network technology, such as 3G, 4G or EDGE(enhanced data rates for global evolution), WiFi (IEEE 802.11 familystandards, or other mobile communication technologies, or anycombination thereof), global positioning system (GPS) receivercomponents, and/or other components. In some embodiments communicationssubsystem 1424 can provide wired network connectivity (e.g., Ethernet)in addition to or instead of a wireless interface.

In some embodiments, communications subsystem 1424 may also receiveinput communication in the form of structured and/or unstructured datafeeds 1426, event streams 1428, event updates 1430, and the like onbehalf of one or more users who may use computer system 1400.

By way of example, communications subsystem 1424 may be configured toreceive data feeds 1426 in real-time from users of social networksand/or other communication services such as Twitter® feeds, Facebook®updates, web feeds such as Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, and/orreal-time updates from one or more third party information sources.

Additionally, communications subsystem 1424 may also be configured toreceive data in the form of continuous data streams, which may includeevent streams 1428 of real-time events and/or event updates 1430, thatmay be continuous or unbounded in nature with no explicit end. Examplesof applications that generate continuous data may include, for example,sensor data applications, financial tickers, network performancemeasuring tools (e.g. network monitoring and traffic managementapplications), clickstream analysis tools, automobile trafficmonitoring, and the like.

Communications subsystem 1424 may also be configured to output thestructured and/or unstructured data feeds 1426, event streams 1428,event updates 1430, and the like to one or more databases that may be incommunication with one or more streaming data source computers coupledto computer system 1400.

Computer system 1400 can be one of various types, including a handheldportable device (e.g., an iPhone® cellular phone, an iPad® computingtablet, a PDA), a wearable device (e.g., a Google Glass® head mounteddisplay), a PC, a workstation, a mainframe, a kiosk, a server rack, orany other data processing system.

Due to the ever-changing nature of computers and networks, thedescription of computer system 1400 depicted in the figure is intendedonly as a specific example. Many other configurations having more orfewer components than the system depicted in the figure are possible.For example, customized hardware might also be used and/or particularelements might be implemented in hardware, firmware, software (includingapplets), or a combination. Further, connection to other computingdevices, such as network input/output devices, may be employed. Based onthe disclosure and teachings provided herein, a person of ordinary skillin the art will appreciate other ways and/or methods to implement thevarious embodiments.

Although specific embodiments of the disclosure have been described,various modifications, alterations, alternative constructions, andequivalents are also encompassed within the scope of the disclosure.Embodiments of the present disclosure are not restricted to operationwithin certain specific data processing environments, but are free tooperate within a plurality of data processing environments.Additionally, although embodiments of the present disclosure have beendescribed using a particular series of transactions and steps, it shouldbe apparent to those skilled in the art that the scope of the presentdisclosure is not limited to the described series of transactions andsteps. Various features and aspects of the above-described embodimentsmay be used individually or jointly.

Further, while embodiments of the present disclosure have been describedusing a particular combination of hardware and software, it should berecognized that other combinations of hardware and software are alsowithin the scope of the present disclosure. Embodiments of the presentdisclosure may be implemented only in hardware, or only in software, orusing combinations thereof. The various processes described herein canbe implemented on the same processor or different processors in anycombination. Accordingly, where components or modules are described asbeing configured to perform certain operations, such configuration canbe accomplished, e.g., by designing electronic circuits to perform theoperation, by programming programmable electronic circuits (such asmicroprocessors) to perform the operation, or any combination thereof.Processes can communicate using a variety of techniques including butnot limited to conventional techniques for inter process communication,and different pairs of processes may use different techniques, or thesame pair of processes may use different techniques at different times.

The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in anillustrative rather than a restrictive sense. It will, however, beevident that additions, subtractions, deletions, and other modificationsand changes may be made thereunto without departing from the broaderspirit and scope as set forth in the claims. Thus, although specificdisclosure embodiments have been described, these are not intended to belimiting. Various modifications and equivalents are within the scope ofthe following claims.

The use of the terms “a” and “an” and “the” and similar referents in thecontext of describing the disclosed embodiments (especially in thecontext of the following claims) are to be construed to cover both thesingular and the plural, unless otherwise indicated herein or clearlycontradicted by context. The terms “comprising,” “having,” “including,”and “containing” are to be construed as open-ended terms (i.e., meaning“including, but not limited to,”) unless otherwise noted. The term“connected” is to be construed as partly or wholly contained within,attached to, or joined together, even if there is something intervening.Recitation of ranges of values herein are merely intended to serve as ashorthand method of referring individually to each separate valuefalling within the range, unless otherwise indicated herein and eachseparate value is incorporated into the specification as if it wereindividually recited herein. All methods described herein can beperformed in any suitable order unless otherwise indicated herein orotherwise clearly contradicted by context. The use of any and allexamples, or exemplary language (e.g., “such as”) provided herein, isintended merely to better illuminate embodiments of the disclosure anddoes not pose a limitation on the scope of the disclosure unlessotherwise claimed. No language in the specification should be construedas indicating any non-claimed element as essential to the practice ofthe disclosure.

Disjunctive language such as the phrase “at least one of X, Y, or Z,”unless specifically stated otherwise, is intended to be understoodwithin the context as used in general to present that an item, term,etc., may be either X, Y, or Z, or any combination thereof (e.g., X, Y,and/or Z). Thus, such disjunctive language is not generally intended to,and should not, imply that certain embodiments require at least one ofX, at least one of Y, or at least one of Z to each be present.

Preferred embodiments of this disclosure are described herein, includingthe best mode known for carrying out the disclosure. Variations of thosepreferred embodiments may become apparent to those of ordinary skill inthe art upon reading the foregoing description. Those of ordinary skillshould be able to employ such variations as appropriate and thedisclosure may be practiced otherwise than as specifically describedherein. Accordingly, this disclosure includes all modifications andequivalents of the subject matter recited in the claims appended heretoas permitted by applicable law. Moreover, any combination of theabove-described elements in all possible variations thereof isencompassed by the disclosure unless otherwise indicated herein.

All references, including publications, patent applications, andpatents, cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference to the sameextent as if each reference were individually and specifically indicatedto be incorporated by reference and were set forth in its entiretyherein.

In the foregoing specification, aspects of the disclosure are describedwith reference to specific embodiments thereof, but those skilled in theart will recognize that the disclosure is not limited thereto. Variousfeatures and aspects of the above-described disclosure may be usedindividually or jointly. Further, embodiments can be utilized in anynumber of environments and applications beyond those described hereinwithout departing from the broader spirit and scope of thespecification. The specification and drawings are, accordingly, to beregarded as illustrative rather than restrictive.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method, comprising: receiving, by a virtualmachine instance in a private tenancy of a first virtual cloud network,a command to execute an operation on a cloud resource of the firstvirtual cloud network, the command being received from a router via aprimary virtual network interface card (vNIC) configured to restrictoutgoing traffic from the virtual machine instance; executing, by thevirtual machine instance, the operation on the cloud resource;generating, by the virtual machine instance, an output of the executionof the operation on the cloud resource; and transmitting, by the virtualmachine instance, the output of the execution of the operation to acomputing device via a secondary virtual network interface card, thesecondary virtual network interface card being configured to restrictincoming traffic to the virtual machine instance, the computing deviceconfigured to be outside the first virtual cloud network, and thesecondary virtual network interface card being configured to transmitthe output of the execution of the operation to the computing device. 2.The method of claim 1, wherein the operation is requested by a user of auser device, and the generating the output of the execution of theoperation comprises: generating a return message for the user device;and transmitting the return message to the router via the primaryvirtual network interface card, wherein the primary virtual networkinterface card is configured to: accept the return message for the userdevice; and reject the output of the execution of the operation.
 3. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the router is in a second virtual cloudnetwork, the second virtual cloud network being different from the firstvirtual cloud network but also implemented in the private tenancy. 4.The method of claim 1, wherein a network gateway is in a third virtualcloud network, the third virtual cloud network being different from thefirst virtual cloud network and being implemented outside the privatetenancy.
 5. The method of claim 4, wherein: the private tenancy isassociated with a first block of IP addresses attributable to networktraffic from the private tenancy; a second tenancy outside of theprivate tenancy is associated with a second block of IP addresses, thesecond block of IP addresses being different from the first block of IPaddresses; and the second block of IP addresses being attributable tonetwork traffic from one or more users of the virtual machine instance.6. The method of claim 1, wherein a network gateway comprises a networkaddress translation (NAT) gateway, being configured to transmit messagesusing an IP address of a block of IP addresses attributable to networktraffic from one or more users of the virtual machine instance.
 7. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the cloud resource comprises a pool ofresource instances, and wherein the executing the operation on the cloudresource further comprises: selecting a resource instance; and executingthe operation on the selected resource instance.
 8. A virtual machineinstance, comprising: a memory configured to store computer-executableinstructions; and a processor configured to access the memory andexecute the computer-executable instructions to at least: receive, bythe virtual machine instance in a private tenancy of a first virtualcloud network, a command to execute an operation on a cloud resource ofthe first virtual cloud network, the command being received from arouter via a primary virtual network interface card (vNIC) configured torestrict outgoing traffic from the virtual machine instance; execute, bythe virtual machine instance, the operation on the cloud resource;generate, by the virtual machine instance, an output of the execution ofthe operation on the cloud resource; and transmit, by the virtualmachine instance, the output of the execution of the operation to acomputing device via a secondary virtual network interface card, thesecondary virtual network interface card being configured to restrictincoming traffic to the virtual machine instance, the computing deviceconfigured to be outside the first virtual cloud network, and thesecondary virtual network interface card being configured to transmitthe output of the execution of the operation to the computing device. 9.The virtual machine instance of claim 8, wherein the operation isrequested by a user of a user device, and the generating the output ofthe execution of the operation comprises: generating a return messagefor the user device; and transmitting the return message to the routervia the primary virtual network interface card, wherein the primaryvirtual network interface card is configured to: accept the returnmessage for the user device; and reject the output of the execution ofthe operation.
 10. The virtual machine instance of claim 8, wherein therouter is in a second virtual cloud network, the second virtual cloudnetwork being different from the first virtual cloud network but alsoimplemented in the private tenancy.
 11. The virtual machine instance ofclaim 8, wherein a network gateway is in a third virtual cloud network,the third virtual cloud network being different from the first virtualcloud network and being implemented outside the private tenancy.
 12. Thevirtual machine instance of claim 11, wherein: the private tenancy isassociated with a first block of IP addresses attributable to networktraffic from the private tenancy; a second tenancy outside of theprivate tenancy is associated with a second block of IP addresses, thesecond block of IP addresses being different from the first block of IPaddresses; and the second block of IP addresses being attributable tonetwork traffic from one or more users of the virtual machine instance.13. The virtual machine instance of claim 8, wherein a network gatewaycomprises a network address translation (NAT) gateway, being configuredto transmit messages using an IP address of a block of IP addressesattributable to network traffic from one or more users of the virtualmachine instance.
 14. The virtual machine instance of claim 8, whereinthe cloud resource comprises a pool of resource instances, and whereinthe executing the operation on the cloud resource further comprises:selecting a resource instance; and executing the operation on theselected resource instance.
 15. A non-transitory computer-readablestorage medium, storing computer-executable instructions that, whenexecuted, cause a virtual machine instance to perform operationscomprising: receiving, by the virtual machine instance in a privatetenancy of a first virtual cloud network, a command to execute anoperation on a cloud resource of the first virtual cloud network, thecommand being received from a router via a primary virtual networkinterface card (vNIC) configured to restrict outgoing traffic from thevirtual machine instance; executing, by the virtual machine instance,the operation on the cloud resource; generating, by the virtual machineinstance, an output of the execution of the operation on the cloudresource; and transmitting, by the virtual machine instance, the outputof the execution of the operation to a computing device via a secondaryvirtual network interface card, the secondary virtual network interfacecard being configured to restrict incoming traffic to the virtualmachine instance, the computing device configured to be outside thefirst virtual cloud network, and the secondary virtual network interfacecard being configured to transmit the output of the execution of theoperation to the computing device.
 16. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the operation isrequested by a user of a user device, and the generating the output ofthe execution of the operation comprises: generating a return messagefor the user device; and transmitting the return message to the routervia the primary virtual network interface card, wherein the primaryvirtual network interface card is configured to: accept the returnmessage for the user device; and reject the output of the execution ofthe operation.
 17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage mediumof claim 15, wherein the router is in a second virtual cloud network,the second virtual cloud network being different from the first virtualcloud network but also implemented in the private tenancy.
 18. Thenon-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein anetwork gateway is in a third virtual cloud network, the third virtualcloud network being different from the first virtual cloud network andbeing implemented outside the private tenancy.
 19. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of claim 18, wherein: the privatetenancy is associated with a first block of IP addresses attributable tonetwork traffic from the private tenancy; a second tenancy outside ofthe private tenancy is associated with a second block of IP addresses,the second block of IP addresses being different from the first block ofIP addresses; and the second block of IP addresses being attributable tonetwork traffic from one or more users of the virtual machine instance.20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15,wherein the cloud resource comprises a pool of resource instances, andwherein the executing the operation on the cloud resource furthercomprises: selecting a resource instance; and executing the operation onthe selected resource instance.